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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2260 
___________ 
 
DIANE R. GOCHIN, 
                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY; CARIANNE P. TORRISSI, Esq. (Individually 
and in her capacity as an officer of the court.); *CHIEF JUSTICE THEODORE MCKEE, 
(Individually and in his administrative capacity); *JUDGE PAUL DIAMOND, 
(Individually and in his official capacity); *JUDGE ANTHONY SCIRICA, (Individually 
and in his official capacity); *JUDGE D. MICHAEL FISHER, (Individually and in his 
official capacity); *JUDGE THOMAS I. VANASKIE, (Individually and in his official 
capacity); *JUDGE KENT JORDAN, (Individually and in his official capacity); 
*JUDGE JULIO FUENTES, (Individually and in his official capacity); *U.S. FEDERAL 
COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA; *U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
            (*Dismissed pursuant to Court’s Order entered 02/09/18) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-06153) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sánchez  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2018 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 12, 2019) 
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___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Diane Gochin appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her claims against the 
Appellees.  For the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 In 2013, Gochin filed an unsuccessful employment discrimination lawsuit against 
Thomas Jefferson University (TJU) in the District Court.  Unhappy with several judges’ 
rulings in her District Court proceedings and on appeal, Gochin filed another lawsuit, 
naming TJU, its attorney, and the federal judges as defendants.  The District Court 
dismissed her claims.  Gochin filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court 
denied.  Gochin then filed a timely notice of appeal.1    
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In her brief, Gochin raises only one 
specific challenge to the District Court’s decision: she contends that her claims could 
only be resolved by a jury trial.  She mistakenly believes that the Constitution guarantees 
her a jury trial for any claim.  However, the Seventh Amendment protects the right to a 
jury trial in civil cases where there are factual issues to be decided.  See In re Peterson, 
253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) (“No one is entitled in a civil case to trial by jury, unless and 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The portion of the District Court’s order dismissing the claims against the Federal 
Appellees was summarily affirmed by a panel of this Court by order entered February 9, 
2018.  Thus, the claims against those Appellees are not before us. 
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except so far as there are issues of fact to be determined.”).  Where a District Court 
concludes as a matter of law that a claim cannot succeed, that legal determination does 
not usurp the fact-finding province of the jury and does not violate the Seventh 
Amendment.  See Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[The] 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was not abridged, because . . . the complaints 
failed as a matter of law to present an issue for trial.”).  The dismissal of Gochin’s claims 
without a jury trial did not violate the Seventh Amendment. 
 Gochin argues that the District Court deliberately omitted facts, misrepresented 
the case, and was biased towards the Appellees.  However, she does not provide any 
examples of this alleged conduct.  She requests that we “provide de novo review of the 
existing record” which she “incorporates by reference.”  While we do review a District 
Court’s dismissal of a complaint de novo, see Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of 
Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2006), we are not obligated to identify 
an appellant’s issues for her.  If a party fails to raise an issue in her opening brief, the 
issue is waived.  A passing reference is not sufficient to raise an issue.  Laborers’ Int’l 
Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994); 
see Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A]ppellants are required to 
set forth the issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in support of those issues 
in their opening brief.”)  To preserve arguments in a brief, an Appellant must support the 
arguments with reasoning as well as citation to authorities and portions of the record in 
support.  Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).  We do not consider undeveloped arguments or 
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those not properly raised and discussed in a brief.  See Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. 
Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 821 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that “passing and conclusory 
statements do not preserve an issue for appeal”).   
 Even with the liberal construction of pro se pleadings, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), Gochin has not properly preserved any challenge to 
the District Court’s order beyond that discussed above.  Nor does Gochin’s reference to 
her District Court pleadings preserve the arguments therein.  “A brief must make all 
arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the 
record.”  DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Chi. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 630 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (incorporation by 
reference not valid method to raise arguments on appeal); Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart 
Title Guar. Co., 327 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir. 2003) (not allowing incorporation of 
arguments by reference). 
 Gochin spends most of her brief arguing that she is the victim of a vast judicial 
conspiracy of fraud against her.  The gist of Gochin’s argument appears to be that the 
only way she could have lost her employment discrimination case was due to judicial 
corruption.  She devotes half of her brief to listing the portions of the Pennsylvania Rules 
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys which involve fraud.  However, that Gochin lost 
her District Court cases and prior appeals is not evidence of fraud or corruption but rather 
simply that her claims were determined to lack legal merit. 
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 For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.  Appellant’s 
motion to change the appellate panel is denied.  Litigants are not entitled to choose the 
gender or geographical origins of the judges who rule on their appeals.  See, e.g., In re 
Specht, 622 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Litigants are not entitled to pick their 
judges.”); United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The [recusal] 
statute is not intended to give litigants a veto power over sitting judges, or a vehicle for 
obtaining a judge of their choice.”); Barnes v. United States, 241 F.2d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 
1956) (litigant had no right to select judge to hear her motion). 
 
